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A B S T R A C T   
The Front-End process plays an essential role in deriving infrastructure megaprojects’ performance. However, 
Front-End issues often negatively impact the process, hindering the value of infrastructure for society. This paper 
aims to systemise knowledge and understanding of the Front-End of infrastructure megaprojects, the main Front- 
End issues, and remedies for managing them. The paper leverages a Systematic Literature Review to address four 
research questions: What definition can appropriately describe the Front-End of infrastructure megaprojects? 
What are the issues at the Front-End of infrastructure megaprojects? What are the remedies for managing the 
issues at the Front-End of infrastructure megaprojects? What are the connections between Front-End issues and 
the remedies for managing them? Following thematic analysis, iterative coding and group discussions, the paper 
develops a definition for the Front-End of infrastructure megaprojects based on five characteristics, identifies 44 
Front-End issues, and connects these issues to six remedies through 17 links.   
1. Introduction 
Megaprojects are “large-scale, complex ventures that typically cost a 
billion US$ or more, take many years to develop and build, involve multiple 
public and private stakeholders, are transformational, and impact millions of 
people” (Flyvbjerg, 2017, p3). Infrastructure is a general term for a basic 
set of fundamental facilities and systems (related to water, energy, 
transport etc.), that support the economic and social development of a 
certain territory (Smallwood, 2020; Bingham and Gibson, 2017; Wil-
liams et al., 2012; Klakegg, 2009). Not all megaprojects are infrastruc-
ture projects (e.g., developing a new vaccine), and, likewise, not all 
infrastructure projects are megaprojects (e.g., a small bridge). In this 
paper, we define an infrastructure megaproject as a ‘large-scale, com-
plex, and one-off infrastructure project with a total capital cost beyond a 
billion US$.’ According to Global Infrastructure Outlook, by 2040, the 
infrastructure sector will globally attract investments of 80 trillion 
dollars (Global Infrastructure Outlook). Significant investment in 
infrastructure megaprojects mandates high stakeholder engagement due 
to substantial socio-economic impact that lasts for an extended period 
(Sainati et al., 2017). This unprecedented effort is an essential part of 
government development plans, which will shape the future of societies 
for decades. 
The Front-End has a significant role in shaping an infrastructure 
megaproject concept (Williams and Samset, 2010) and performance 
(Morris, 2013a). Poor front-end outcomes is one of the leading causes of 
inferior infrastructure megaprojects performance (Denicol et al., 2020). 
The reasons that contribute to generating poor front-end outcomes are 
widely discussed in the literature. In this study, front-end issues refer to 
those reasons, and remedies are the corrective actions for managing the 
front-end issues. By managing, we mean the ways that project managers 
can address, encounter, and hamper the issues. Also, front-end outcomes 
refer to the output of the managerial activities such as risk management, 
value management, and stakeholder management etc., within the 
front-end process. 
Following a Systematic Literature Review (SLR), this paper aims to 
systemise knowledge and understanding of the front-end of infrastruc-
ture megaprojects, the main front-end issues, and remedies for man-
aging them. The paper focuses on the front-end of infrastructure 
megaprojects since it is complicated (Williams and Samset, 2010), 
lengthy (Meier, 2008), involves many uncertainties and trade-offs (Gil 
et al., 2015; Giezen et al., 2015) and plays a significant role in projects 
performance (Klakegg, 2009). Furthermore, identifying front-end issues 
and using remedies for managing them creates the basis for preventing 
the issues in future projects and increases the potential to enhance 
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infrastructure megaprojects performance (Sainati et al., 2017; Williams 
and Samset, 2010). Consequently, this generates massive rewards for 
project companies, governments and societies (Brookes and Locatelli, 
2015; Williams et al., 2019). 
Williams et al. (2019) provide a comprehensive SLR on the front-end. 
They investigate the front-end as a generic process for all project cate-
gories and discuss front-end importance, nature, its different elements, 
and roles and responsibilities during the front-end. They articulate 
front-end activities and explain how these activities function together. 
Building on Williams et al. (2019), our paper has two fundamental dif-
ferences. First, our paper only focuses on the front-end of infrastructure 
megaprojects. Second, we investigate the issues at the front-end process 
and present the remedies for managing them. We consider both public 
and private infrastructure megaprojects. In particular, our paper ad-
dresses the following research questions: 
1 What definition can appropriately describe the Front-End of infra-
structure megaprojects? 
The literature is ambiguous about front-end, especially when it 
comes to infrastructure megaprojects. Considering that front-end liter-
ature is dispersed across several domains (new product development, 
innovation management, IT, etc.), it is essential to precisely define what 
constitutes front-end in the infrastructure megaproject domain.  
2 What are the issues at the Front-End of infrastructure megaprojects? 
Precisely implemented front-end can enhance the infrastructure 
megaproject performance; however, front-end is often associated with 
issues (Williams and Samset, 2010). Literature about front-end issues is 
dispersed, and by this research question, we intend to collect all the 
front-end issues and deliver a comprehensive list of them.  
3 What are the remedies for managing the issues at the Front-End of 
infrastructure megaprojects? 
Academics and project managers developed remedies for managing 
front-end issues, such as using lessons learned (Miller and Hobbs, 2005) 
and involving external stakeholders’ views in decision-making (Wil-
liams and Samset, 2010; Samset and Volden, 2016). This research 
question systematically collects these remedies and clarifies how they 
are linked to the issues in a broad perspective.  
4 What are the connections between Front-End issues and remedies? 
Following research questions 2 and 3, this research question dem-
onstrates which specific remedies are more appropriate to manage a 
particular issue (or a group of issues). This research question also shows 
the key remedies for front-end issues and emphasises the gaps between 
issues and remedies requiring more attention. 
Infrastructure megaprojects as the change agents (Miller and Hobbs, 
2005) engage policymakers, project managers and society. Front-end 
has a pivotal role in linking the abovementioned stakeholders (Aalto-
nen et al., 2016). The front-end enables the stakeholders to work 
together at the infrastructure megaprojects initial stages when there is 
considerable space for changing the project concept, creating value, 
managing the risks and using the opportunities (Williams et al., 2019; 
Merrow, 2011; Fuentes et al., 2019). In this process, policymakers and 
project managers have the leadership role (Edkins et al., 2013), and 
society pays the costs and bears the consequences (DiMaddaloni and 
Davis, 2018). Therefore, this paper’s contributions and recommenda-
tions go beyond the project management academics and include poli-
cymakers, project managers, and society, helping them get better results 
from infrastructure megaprojects. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Following the intro-
duction, Section 2 explains the methodology of SLR. Section 3 describes 
the SLR results associated with the research questions 1 to 3, respec-
tively. Section 4 shows the connection between front-end issues 
(research question 2) and remedies for managing them (research ques-
tion 3), section 5 presents the implications for society, policymakers and 
other relevant stakeholders. Finally, section 6 presents the key 
conclusions. 
2. Method 
We employed a Systematic Literature Review (SLR) consisting of 
three stages: planning, conducting the review, and reporting the findings 
(Tranfield et al., 2003; DiMaddaloni and Davis, 2017). 
2.1. Planning stage 
The planning stage’s goal is to develop a protocol for searching 
relevant data along with inclusion and exclusion criteria (DiMaddaloni 
and Davis, 2017). Brainstorming sessions, review of the literature and 
group discussions led us to ‘Front End,’ ‘Megaproject,’ and ‘Infrastruc-
ture’ as three main keywords and developed the following list:  
• Front End: “Front End,” “Front-End Loading,” “Front-End Engineering 
and Design,” “Front-End Planning,” “Pre-Project Planning,” “Explor-
atory Phase,” “Conceptual Phase,” “Early Stage,” “Appraisal Phase,” 
“Project Governance,” “Project Strategy,” “Pre-Contract Phase,” 
“Project Definition Phase,” “Preliminary Stage,” “Initiative Stage,” 
“Seminal Stage,” “Ex ante Appraisal,” “Acquisition Stage,” “Feasibility 
Study,” “Planning."  
• Megaproject: “Megaproject,” “Major Project,” “Capital Project,” 
“Large Project,” “Large Construction Project,” “Project,” “Large Engi-
neering Projects,” “Complex Project."  
• Infrastructure: “Infrastructure,” “Public Project." 
2.2. Conducting the review process 
We used “Scopus” as a searching database for its academic merits and 
the possibility to customise the search. Therefore, we combined the 
abovementioned keywords to make the following searching string: 
“Front-End” or “Front-End Loading” or “Front-End Engineering and 
Design” or “Front-End Planning” or “Pre Project Planning” or “Explor-
atory Phase” or “Conceptual Phase” or “Early Stage” or “Appraisal 
Phase” or “Project Governance” or “Project Strategy” or “Pre Contract 
Phase” or “Project Definition Phase” or “Preliminary Stage” or “Initia-
tive Stage” or “Seminal Stage” or Ex-ante Appraisal” or “Acquisition 
Stage” or “Feasibility Study” or “Planning” AND “Megaproject” or 
“Major Project” or “Capital Project” or “Large Project” or “Large Con-
struction Project” or “Project” or “Complex Project” or “Large Engi-
neering Projects” AND “Infrastructure” or “Public Project." 
The result of this string was 4195 journal articles. We limited the 
results to English and journal articles and restricted the field of study to 
Business, Management and Accounting, Engineering, Decision Science, Eco-
nomics Econometrics and Finance, Energy, Social Sciences, Multidisciplinary 
and Undefined. We only considered articles that were published after 
2000. Following the limitations, we retrieved 1672 articles. 
We evaluated the articles following this protocol:  
1. Title, keywords and abstract. Consistent with (DiMaddaloni and 
Davis, 2017), in the first step we read the title, keywords, and ab-
stract of each article. After this step, we excluded 962 articles, and 
710 remained for analysis. 
2. Introduction and conclusion. In this step, we reviewed the intro-
duction and conclusion of the 710 remaining articles in detail and 
excluded 440 of them; consequently, 270 articles remained for the 
next step. 
A. Babaei et al.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
Project Leadership and Society 2 (2021) 100032
3
3. We read the remaining articles (by scanning the context, checking 
the tables, reading the headings and the first sentence of each 
paragraph, etc.), and 93 moved to the analysis step.  
4. After initial analysis from 93 articles, only 64 were relevant to the 
research objectives, which we used to derive findings.  
5. In addition to the articles, we used four essential references: three 
relevant books from leading authors in the field (references (Morris, 
2013b), (Merrow, 2011) and (Miller and Lessard, 2001)) and a 
relevant government document (Treasury, 2018). 
Findings are the output of iterative group discussions on the thematic 
analysis results. The leading author read all the articles (64 articles) and 
started a first thematic analysis following (Vaismoradi et al., 2013) using 
Nvivo to code the data as presented in (Saldana, 2013). We organised 
the themes in the group discussions with the co-authors and refined the 
codes. The lead author reviewed the articles again to avoid overlooking 
essential data and to check if the themes were inclusive enough to cover 
all the codes. We continued the iteration until marginal improvements 
were negligible and repeated a similar process to answer research 
questions one to three. We identified five critical characteristics for the 
front-end and proposed them in a new definition; we found 44 issues and 
clustered them into six themes, and we derived six remedies with 17 
links to the issues. For the fourth research question we adopted the bi-
nary reductionist approach (i.e., yes/no) and connected issues to rem-
edies through the abovementioned 17 links. Table 1 shows the result of 
thematic analysis and the themes related to them. We adopted this 
approach from the protocol presented in (Denicol et al., 2020). 
3. Findings 
In this section, we answer the first three research questions. 
3.1. What definition can appropriately describe the front-end of 
infrastructure megaprojects? 
Front-end has various definitions; we deemed 12 relevant to the 
scope of the paper (Table 2). Although the definitions are well developed 
to serve the specific goals of their respective documents, no single 
definition combines key characteristics of infrastructure megaprojects’ 
front-end. 
A fundamental dilemma in defining front-end is considering front- 
end as a project phase or if a project starts when front-end finishes 
(Williams et al., 2019). The rationale behind considering the front-end 
as a project phase is that implementing the front-end requires a great 
deal of managerial knowledge, expertise, and effort (DiMaddaloni and 
Davis, 2018); therefore, the front-end is within the project management 
scope (Morris, 2016). Considering the front-end as a project phase is 
consistent with the UK Infrastructure and Projects Authority approach to 
the Five Case Model (Project Business Case) for infrastructure project 
initiation. In this approach, project managers should actively engage 
with front-end decision-making (Morris, 2016). 
The other school of thought states that because the project only exists 
conceptually at the front-end stage (Samset and Volden, 2017), the 
front-end is not a project phase. Not considering the front-end as a 
project phase is consistent with the Norway Quality Assurance (QA) 
scheme (Morris, 2013a). The rationale for excluding the front-end from 
the project is that implementing the front-end does not guarantee 
project execution (Edkins et al., 2013). Excluding the front-end from the 
project defines but does not limit front-end project managers’ positions 
at the project level in which project managers have an advisory role 
during front-end (Williams et al., 2019). Compared to the UK, in Nor-
way, politicians have slightly less reliance on managerial advice in 
deciding to implement a project (Samset and Volden, 2017). 
Front-end inclusion or exclusion from a project definition impacts 
Table 1 
The result of thematic analysis; themes and categories.  
Category Theme Concept Category Theme Concept 








What are the remedies 
for managing the front- 
end issues? 
Using more qualitative data and 
less detailed quantitative analysis 
for decision-making 
Evaluating alternative concepts fast and 
flexible without the need for detailed 
information 
Social value assessment and value creation 
in shaping the concept, all aspects of 
infrastructure benefits are not quantifiable 
Staff working 
behaviour 
Increasing half-life of the front-end 
outcomes 
Involving external stakeholders’ 
views in decision-making 




Political bias Helps to align project goals and objectives 
with stakeholders’ goals and objectives and 
prevents future conflicts 
Lack of evidence- 
based decision- 
making 
Generating reliable estimations 
and controlling the quality of the 
Results 











Decrease the chance of manipulating project 
decisions 
Incentivise good and penalise the lousy 
practice 
Human factors Cognitive biases Applying lesson learned Use Lessons for training purposes to increase 
the effectiveness of the practices 
Human restrictions Creating a database for better estimations 
and evaluating alternative concepts 
Project context Changes in the project 
context 
Increasing the skills and 
competencies of the front-end 
actors 
Increasing the managerial competency of 
project managers 
Increasing the individual competency of 
project managers 










Defining procedures, roles, and 
responsibilities 
Managing a project for its context  
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project managers’ roles and responsibilities, the accountability of the 
decisions (Morris, 2013a; Williams et al., 2019), and, consequently, the 
competencies required for the project managers’ role and re-
sponsibilities in the front-end process (Edkins et al., 2013). Both ap-
proaches agree that project managers require knowledge and expertise 
beyond the traditional project management framework to address 
front-end challenges adequately (Morris, 2013a, 2016; Williams et al., 
2019). 
For this study, consistent with the UK approach, we consider the 
front-end as a project phase. Also, our SLR focuses on the front-end’s 
institutional and strategic aspects. This approach is aligned with other 
researchers, more notably (Morris, 2013a, 2016). Table 2 shows the 
front-end definitions (associated with the aim of this paper) and the 
characteristics each definition uses to define the front-end of infra-
structure megaprojects. 
Five essential characteristics emerged from analysing front-end 
definitions: (1) Exploratory nature, (2) Generating managerial infor-
mation, (3) Shaping a feasible concept, (4) Terminating with a decision, 
and (5) Uncertainty. 
First, infrastructure megaprojects’ front-end is an exploratory process 
since it looks for different alternatives (Samset et al., 2013) to find the 
most feasible concept for the project (Samset et al., 2017). Exploring 
project alternatives is often disregarded from the infrastructure mega-
projects front-end process (Williams and Samset, 2010; Williams et al., 
2019), which is a critical reason for the failure in their performance 
(Meier, 2008). 
Second, the front-end generates managerial information for decision- 
making and shaping an infrastructure megaproject concept (Edkins 
et al., 2013). This information results from several management activ-
ities, including cost estimation, risk identification, and value formula-
tion (Elzomor et al., 2018). Front-end information comes from various 
sources and in different details (Morris and Geraldi, 2011) based on 
factors such as organisation maturity (Williams et al., 2019; Edkins 
et al., 2013), project type (Williams and Samset, 2010; Gil et al., 2015) 
and front-end procedures in a respective country (Samset and Volden, 
2017). 
Third, the front-end process shapes a feasible concept for an infra-
structure megaproject based on its outcomes (Williams and Samset, 
2010). The feasible concept should be shaped in an opportunity space 
(Samset et al., 2013), considering the different stakeholders’ needs, 
goals, and requirements (Samset et al., 2013, 2017). The feasible 
concept should balance society and stakeholders’ various and conflict-
ing interests (Aaltonen et al., 2016) and be politically practicable 
(Samset et al., 2017). 
Fourth, implementing the front-end does not guarantee project 
execution, and it is a challenging aspect of the front-end of infrastructure 
megaprojects (Treasury, 2018). Front-end outcomes should lead to the 
decision to continue (“Go”) or stop (“No Go”) a project. Due to an 
infrastructure megaprojects’ essential impact on society, this decision is 
usually affected by political interests, influential government groups and 
lobbyists (Klakegg, 2009; Mottee et al., 2020). 
Lastly, the uncertainty inherent to an infrastructure megaproject’s 
early phase (Kloppenborg and Tesch, 2009) plays an essential role in 
front-end decisions and has positive (i.e., opportunity) and negative (i. 
e., risk) aspects. One goal of the front-end process is to reduce projects’ 
uncertainty (Elzomor et al., 2018) and improve the predictability of an 
infrastructure megaproject performance (Welde and Odeck, 2017). 
Often, front-end decision-makers focus on reducing risk without paying 
enough attention to take advantage of opportunities (Giezen et al., 
2015). 
According to the abovementioned characteristics, we define the 
front-end as: 
‘An exploratory process for generating necessary information to 
shape a feasible concept for an infrastructure megaproject, assess the 
concepts’ uncertainties and make the final go/no-go decision’. 
Although the definition specifies the front-end of infrastructure 
megaprojects, it also refers to general aspects of front-end due to the 
typical characteristics of a project’s early stages and the front-end 
process’s function in different project categories. 
Table 2 
Front-End definitions and highlighted Front-End characteristics in each definition.  
Definition Characteristics 
“Project definition [phase] is regarded as the phase of project development where 
exploration of alternatives creates an innovative problem and solution definitions that 
allow maximum customer value generation to be developed.” (Whelton et al., 2002, 
p197) 
Defines a project concept, develops alternatives, innovative, create value, exploratory 
process, 
“Front-end planning is the essential process of developing sufficient strategic information 
with which the owners can address risks and make decisions to commit resources to 
maximise the potential for a successful project.” (Bingham and Gibson, 2017, p1) 
An essential process for defining a project’s strategy, addresses risk, involve decision- 
making, ends up in final go or no-go decision for a project, uncertain, helps the project 
owner, maximise the chance of project success, 
“The stage when value propositions are formulated is rich in interactions, especially for 
large complex megaprojects. ” (Smyth et al., 2018, p174) 
Defines the value for a project, has high stakeholder interaction 
“The phase of planning, before the point when decision-makers finally commit to the 
financing of a project, is often referred to in the literature as the front-end phase of a 
project.” (Welde and Odeck, 2017, p615) 
Plans a project, ends up in final go or no-go decision for a project, decision-makers play 
a crucial role, uncertain 
“Activities and deliverables that occur prior the program entering the execution phase.” ( 
Meier, 2008, p59) 
Activity for planning a project, conduct before execution 
“Where requirements are elicited and then accepted by the subsequent sanction stage.” ( 
Morris, 2013b, p164) 
Defines a project’s requirements 
“Initial construction planning which takes place during the preconstruction phase of a 
project.” (Johansen and Wilson, 2006, p1305) 
Focuses on the execution phase, plans a project’s construction 
“The period prior to sanction of the project front-end loading.” (Merrow, 2011, p24) It takes place before starting a project (execution) 
“The period up until the permanent organisation tasks the person or organisation who is 
to be responsible for delivering the project.” (Williams et al., 2019, p73) 
Done by a permanent organisation, ends up with go or no-go decision for a project, 
uncertain 
“The early stages of development leading up to the appraisal of the project.” (Klakegg, 
2009, p500) 
Develops project appraisal, takes place early in the project 
“The front-end phase is the stage when the project only exists conceptually before being 
operationalised.” (Samset and Volden, 2017, p93) 
Defines a project’s concept, takes place before the execution, ambiguous 
“Front-end is a general term used for the somewhat unstructured period between the 
proverbial a blank sheet of paper, up to the project proposal.” (Kock et al., 2016, p116) 
Unstructured, Uncertain, defines a project concept  
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3.2. What are the issues at the front-end of infrastructure megaprojects? 
We retrieved 44 front-end issues from 12 papers (Klakegg, 2009; 
Williams and Samset, 2010; Flyvbjerg, 2007, 2013; Volden, 2019a; 
Meier, 2008; Samset and Volden, 2016; Aaltonen et al., 2016; Welde and 
Odeck, 2017; Samset et al., 2013; Cantarelli et al., 2010; Andersen et al., 
2016) and clustered them based on their context into six themes, 
namely: (1) Front-end project managers, (2) Politicians and 
decision-makers, (3) Front-end process and outcomes, (4) Human fac-
tors, (5) Project context, (6) The early phase of infrastructure 
megaprojects. From theme one to five, we divided each theme’s issues 
into two groups according to their impact area and similarities. Theme 
six remained in one group since issues have no distinct differences. 
Table 3 provides an overview, and then each theme is explained in the 
following paragraphs. 
3.2.1. Front-end project managers 
This theme refers to the issues caused by front-end staff and man-
agers and consists of two groups: (1) Skills and competencies and (2) 
Staff working behaviour. 
Table 3 
A comprehensive list of Front-End Issues.  
Themes Groups Issues 
Front-end project managers Skills and Competencies 
Staff working behaviour 
1. Lack of skills and competency in project managers for managing front-end (Williams and Samset, 2010;  
Meier, 2008) 
2. Difficulty in acquiring the required skills and competencies (Meier, 2008) 
3. Unclear roles and responsibilities in the front-end process (Meier, 2008; Welde and Odeck, 2017) 
1. Reluctance to say no to the higher managers (Flyvbjerg, 2013) 
2. Too much confidence in front-end outcomes (Klakegg, 2009) 
3. No effort to find alternative concepts (Williams and Samset, 2010; Samset and Volden, 2016; Samset et al., 
2013) 
4. Perverse incentives (Flyvbjerg, 2013; Volden, 2019a) 
Politicians and decision makers Political bias 
Lack of evidence-based 
decision making 
1. Principal agent issue at front-end (Volden, 2019a) 
2. Putting political priorities first (Klakegg, 2009; Williams and Samset, 2010; Aaltonen et al., 2016; Volden, 
2019a) 
3. Putting too much pressure on a particular concept (Meier, 2008; Samset and Volden, 2016; Volden, 
2019a) 
4. Decision-making based on short term interests (Samset and Volden, 2016) 
5. Politicians do not represent society’s expectations (Williams and Samset, 2010) 
1. Unclear decision-making process (Williams and Samset, 2010; Samset and Volden, 2016) 
2. Lack of attention to the project context (Williams and Samset, 2010) 
3. Lack of competency in using analytical information (Klakegg, 2009) 
4. Reluctance to use the analysts’ advice by politicians (Samset and Volden, 2016; Gibson et al., 2010) 
5. Overcommitting a project concept (Samset and Volden, 2016; Aaltonen et al., 2016; Cantarelli et al., 
2010) 
6. Lock-in (Cantarelli et al., 2010) 
7. Path dependency (Williams and Samset, 2010) 
8. Not using the opportunity space for defining the project concept (Samset et al., 2013) 
Front-End process and outcomes Conducting the Process 
Generating the Outcomes 
1. Front-end sunk cost (Cantarelli et al., 2010; Flyvbjerg, 2007) 
• Long process (Welde and Odeck, 2017) 
• Costly process (Flyvbjerg, 2007) 
2. High staff turnover (Meier, 2008) 
3. The ambiguity of the process (Williams and Samset, 2010) 
1. Generating unreliable estimations (Samset and Volden, 2016) 
2. Inadequate external evaluation of estimations (Flyvbjerg, 2013) 
3. Too much reliance on detailed quantitative data (Williams and Samset, 2010; Samset and Volden, 2016;  
Welde and Odeck, 2017) 
4. Too little evaluation of the people’s expectations (Klakegg, 2009) 
Human factors Cognitive biases 
Human restrictions 
1. Optimism bias and the planning fallacy 
• Underestimating technical issues related to the project implementation (Meier, 2008) 
• Underestimating costs, risks, etc. Overestimating the benefits (Williams and Samset, 2010; Flyvbjerg, 2013; 
Andersen et al., 2016) 
2. Postponing solving conflicts (Klakegg, 2009) 
3. Groupthink (Williams and Samset, 2010) 
4. Bounded awareness/rationality (Williams and Samset, 2010; Cantarelli et al., 2010) 
1. Inability to value realisation for assets’ lifecycle at early stages (Samset and Volden, 2016) 
2. Inability to find the early warning signs (Williams et al., 2012) 
3. Inability to align the long term strategies with project objectives (Williams et al., 2012; Williams and 
Samset, 2010; Samset and Volden, 2016; Andersen et al., 2016) 
Project context Changes in the project context 
Characteristics of the 
project’s context 
1. Changes in the political group in power over time (Samset and Volden, 2016) 
2. Changes in society’s needs and priorities (Samset and Volden, 2016) 
1. Corrupt environment (Flyvbjerg, 2013) 
• Misrepresentation of cost and revenue (Flyvbjerg, 2013) 
2. Impact of the project environment on the decision-makers (Williams et al., 2012; Williams and Samset, 
2010) 
• Organisational culture 
The early phase of infrastructure 
megaprojects 
Nature of Megaprojects 1. Unclear project goals and objectives (Klakegg, 2009; Williams and Samset, 2010; Meier, 2008) 
2. High level of complexity (Williams and Samset, 2010) 
3. Stakeholder dynamics (Samset and Volden, 2016; Andersen et al., 2016) 
4. Conflicting goals and objectives between stakeholders (Klakegg, 2009) 
5. High level of uncertainty (Williams and Samset, 2010; Meier, 2008; Samset and Volden, 2016) 
6. Lack of information for decision-making (Williams and Samset, 2010; Samset and Volden, 2016; Andersen 
et al., 2016)  
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Skills and competencies. The key issue in this group is the lack of skills 
and competencies of project managers managing the front-end (Klakegg, 
2009; Miller and Lessard, 2001; Morris, 2016; Samset and Volden, 
2017). Due to the front-end’s strategic nature (Edkins et al., 2013), the 
traditional project management framework does not adequately cover 
all the required expertise for managing the front-end (Morris, 2013a, 
2016; Edkins et al., 2013; Morris and Geraldi, 2011). Project managers 
with relevant skills and competencies are scarce (Meier, 2008; Edkins 
et al., 2013), and companies should compete over hiring them (Edkins 
et al., 2013). Moreover, many skilled staff are reluctant to join projects 
at the front-end since the execution is not guaranteed, and the 
competitive job market offers them better opportunities (Edkins et al., 
2013). 
Staff working behaviour. The key issue here is ‘perverse incentives.’ 
Cantarelli et al. (2010) highlight two approaches to the front-end, 
namely “formal” and “real.” Formal front-end is when the 
decision-makers determine the project concept long before the front-end 
finishes, and front-end is only a formal process to justify a pre-
determined concept. Meanwhile, a real front-end’s goal is finding a 
feasible alternative among different possibilities (Cantarelli et al., 
2010). 
Perverse incentives (Volden, 2019a) is a consequence of a formal 
front-end (Samset and Volden, 2016, 2017) and refers to a situation in 
which the front-end team does not find incentives in providing evidence 
for stopping the project (Volden, 2019a). Reluctance to disagree with 
political decisions happens when there are no incentives in halting the 
project causes (Meier, 2008; Williams et al., 2019; Flyvbjerg, 2013; 
George et al., 2008). In this atmosphere, the front-end team becomes 
overconfident in the project concept (Samset et al., 2013) and loses 
motivation for finding better alternatives (Samset and Volden, 2016; 
Cantarelli et al., 2010). 
3.2.2. Politicians and decision-makers 
Issues in this theme refer to the role of decision-makers at govern-
ment and institutional levels. The category consists of two groups: (1) 
Political biases and (2) Lack of evidence-based decision-making. 
Political biases. Volden (2019a), Samset et al. (2013) and Samset and 
Christensen (2017) mention that, often, front-end decisions are political, 
and in many instances, politicians do not represent and sometimes 
ignore society’s expectations (Klakegg, 2009; Edkins et al., 2013). Pol-
iticians tend to advocate an infrastructure megaproject concept that 
serves their parties’ interests without considering the project’s long term 
performance and social impacts (Klakegg, 2009; Volden, 2019a). This 
results in putting too much pressure on executing a particular concept 
through the formal front-end (Meier, 2008; Samset and Volden, 2016; 
Hetemi et al., 2020), and therefore the opportunity space is not capi-
talised on (Samset et al., 2013). 
In some cases, the pressure on starting the project even before fin-
ishing the front-end leaves the choice of concept for negotiation and 
compromise between interest groups (Hetemi et al., 2020). Hetemi et al. 
(2020) mention that politicians mostly care about the publicity of cut-
ting the red ribbons without considering how they are going to finish the 
project. Meier (2008) highlights that rushing into the execution for 
political reasons causes over-optimism and “bounded awareness,” which 
“prevents [politicians] from seeing, seeking, using, or sharing highly relevant 
information during the decision-making process.” (Meier, 2008, p61). 
Lack of evidence-based decision-making. This group refers to the situ-
ation in which decision-makers are unable to use the analytical results 
regarding defining project goals and objectives due to a lack of analyt-
ical knowledge (Klakegg, 2009) or avoid considering them in 
decision-making (Hetemi et al., 2020) as a consequence of personal or 
political reasons (Klakegg, 2009). The key issue here is overcommitting 
a specific concept, which means the inability to withdraw from a project 
(Cantarelli et al., 2010) when no evidence shows the project will have 
satisfactory performance (Meier, 2008; Johansen and Wilson, 2006; 
Flyvbjerg, 2014). Cantarelli et al. (2010) mention that overcommitment 
per se is not harmful in all situations, but when it leads decision-makers 
to lock-in, it causes ineffective decisions that lead to “escalating 
commitment of decision-makers to an ineffective course of action” (Can-
tarelli et al., 2010, p792). Hetemi et al. (2020) criticise the reductionist 
view in defining lock-in, which underestimates complex nature at the 
front-end of infrastructure megaprojects. Hetemi et al. (2020) mention 
that lock-in is a contextual phenomenon, and it happens due to 
long-term organisational mechanisms. 
Another issue in front-end decision-making is path dependency 
(Samset et al., 2013; Cantarelli et al., 2010), which refers to 
decision-makers tendency to make decisions based on their previous 
experience without considering the new circumstances (Giezen et al., 
2015; Samset et al., 2013). Decision-makers affected by path de-
pendency follow what they have done in past projects, paying limited 
attention to the alternatives (Samset et al., 2013). Consequently, they 
cannot use the opportunity space to the optimum level (Samset et al., 
2013, 2017) since they fail to find different alternatives, including the 
Zero option (Samset et al., 2013) (i.e., “business as usual”) as the most 
profitable alternative (Samset and Christensen, 2017). Zero option re-
fers, for instance, to upgrading an existing asset instead of executing a 
new one (Samset et al., 2013). 
Unclear decision-making procedures is another issue in this theme. 
Williams and Samset (2010) note that front-end decision-makers, in 
many instances, do not follow the logical process, and Samset and 
Volden (2016) describe it as “unstructured and affected by chance.” 
(p302). One explanation for this issue is decision-makers tendency to 
manipulate project decisions (Flyvbjerg, 2007) to support their favourite 
project concept (Welde and Odeck, 2017). Another reason is that 
decision-makers merely lack the skills and competencies to comprehend 
the analytical information (Klakegg, 2009). 
3.2.3. Front-end process and outcomes 
The theme refers to issues associated with implementing the front- 
end and consists of two groups: (1) Issues in conducting the front-end 
process and (2) Issues in generating front-end outcomes. 
Issues in conducting the front-end process. This group’s critical issue is 
high ‘sunk cost’ due to the time and cost associated with the long front- 
end process of infrastructure megaprojects (Welde and Odeck, 2017; 
Johansen and Wilson, 2006). Front-end cost for an infrastructure 
megaproject accounts for up to 35% of the project costs (Cantarelli et al., 
2010; Hwang and Ho, 2012). After paying the front-end cost, 
decision-makers are reluctant to end up with no project (Miller and 
Lessard, 2001); consequently, they are unlikely to withdraw from the 
project. 
The front-end process for infrastructure megaprojects often goes 
beyond one parliamentary period (four to five years) (Samset and Vol-
den, 2017); this inevitably entails changes in the project context and the 
political party in power (Welde and Odeck, 2017; Cantarelli et al., 
2010). Changes in project context may change society’s needs and 
problems (Welde and Odeck, 2017). When it adds to political changes, 
they may shift the strategic priorities and question the demand for the 
project (Mottee et al., 2020). Political changes also have severe conse-
quences for getting required permissions later in execution (such as 
making an access road to the site) (Merrow, 2011). Furthermore, the 
long front-end is associated with staff turnover, which causes a lack of 
expertise, inconsistency in management and accountability problems 
(Meier, 2008). Staff turnover creates a negative loop since the new 
manager needs to review the documents again (Meier, 2008). 
Issues in generating front-end outcomes. The key issue in this group is 
over-reliance on detailed quantitative information (Williams and Sam-
set, 2010; Welde and Odeck, 2017; Andersen et al., 2016). Front-end 
decisions for infrastructure megaprojects are conventionally based on 
detailed quantitative information (Samset and Volden, 2016). However, 
detailed quantitative information at the front-end is often unreliable 
(Williams and Samset, 2010; Samset and Volden, 2016; Welde and 
Odeck, 2017; Samset and Christensen, 2017) and expires quickly due to 
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changes in the project context and the project concept (Williams and 
Samset, 2010; Samset and Christensen, 2017). Therefore, the informa-
tion requires frequent adjustments during the front-end period to 
comply with the changes (Williams and Samset, 2010; Welde and Odeck, 
2017). Adjusting the information frequently is impractical because it is 
costly, time-consuming (Samset et al., 2013) and vulnerable to new 
changes (Welde and Odeck, 2017). Often lobbyists use this unreliable 
information to justify their front-end decisions and obtain approval for 
their pet project (Samset and Volden, 2016; Welde and Odeck, 2017). 
Welde and Odeck (2017) highlight how relying on detailed quantitative 
cost and value estimations results in higher cost overrun at the front-end 
of infrastructure megaprojects compared to execution. 
Inadequate evaluation of the external stakeholders’ expectations 
(Klakegg, 2009) is a consequence of the formal front-end process 
(Samset and Volden, 2017; Cantarelli et al., 2010) and causes 
decision-making with the absence of diverse views (Smyth et al., 2018; 
Suprayoga et al., 2020). This leads the front-end team to shape a concept 
that does not meet the stakeholders’ expectations (Klakegg, 2009) and 
causes future conflict (Aaltonen et al., 2016; Cuppen et al., 2016). 
3.2.4. Human factors 
This theme refers to issues associated with human capabilities. Two 
groups of human factors are involved in front-end issues: (1) Cognitive 
Biases and (2) Human restrictions. 
Cognitive Biases. Optimism bias is the well-recognised cognitive bias 
described in infrastructure megaproject front-end literature (Williams 
and Samset, 2010; Flyvbjerg, 2013). Optimism bias causes over-
estimations of benefits and value and underestimations of costs 
(Flyvbjerg, 2013). The planning fallacy results from the optimism bias, 
which impacts the front-end of infrastructure megaproject decisions 
(Cantarelli et al., 2010). 
The second cognitive bias is ‘conflict avoidance,’ which refers to 
postponing the conflicts instead of solving them (Klakegg, 2009). Kla-
kegg (2009) mentions that unsolved problems tend to become more 
severe in later phases; in contrast, Giezen et al. (2015) consider unsolved 
conflicts as opportunities to increase the flexibility of the decisions 
facing future changes. “Groupthink” refers to “where the individuals within 
a group conform in their thinking with, what they think, is the group 
consensus” (Williams and Samset, 2010, p41). It is another cognitive bias 
at front-end decision-making resulting from ineffective communication 
amongst stakeholders (Williams and Samset, 2010). 
Human restrictions. Issues in this group are associated with the front- 
end team’s limited ability in predicting an infrastructure megaproject’s 
future values, risks, etc., at the early stages of its lifecycle (Williams and 
Samset, 2010; Samset and Volden, 2016). An infrastructure megaproj-
ect’s lifecycle spans decades, if not centuries, during which many 
changes occur in technological and socio-economic aspects of a society 
(Samset and Volden, 2016), and it is impossible to forecast them. 
Therefore, infrastructure megaprojects require more flexibility to 
accommodate the changes; but this is challenging, costly and involves 
trade-offs (Gil et al., 2015). Usually, the front-end team sticks to the firm 
options to avoid the consequent costs; this makes the project concept 
vulnerable to the changes (Gil et al., 2015). 
3.2.5. Project context 
Issues in this category are rooted in the project context and envi-
ronment, divided into two groups: (1) Change in the project context and 
(2) Characteristics of the project context. 
Change in the project context. An infrastructure megaproject’s prin-
cipal goal is to meet society’s everchanging needs and problems (Wil-
liams and Samset, 2010; Samset and Volden, 2016; Samset et al., 2013). 
Political changes, along with social changes (Samset and Volden, 2017), 
cause difficulty in defining project goals and objectives and aligning 
them with society’s needs and problems (Samset and Volden, 2016); this 
create challenges for the front-end team to define an appropriate 
concept for the infrastructure megaprojects (Williams et al., 2012; 
Williams and Samset, 2010; Edkins et al., 2013). 
Characteristics of the project context. Corruption is the key issue in this 
theme (Locatelli et al., 2017). Locatelli et al. (2017) indicate that 
megaprojects are fertile grounds for developing corruption due to 
characteristics such as colossal investment, high complexity, and 
engaging with various stakeholders. Corruption is also discussed as a 
systematic misrepresentation of infrastructure megaproject value and 
benefits, affecting front-end decisions (Welde and Odeck, 2017; Flyvb-
jerg, 2013). 
The key internal stakeholders’ organisational culture is a vital 
element of the robust front-end process (Williams et al., 2012; Edkins 
et al., 2013; Shiferaw and Klakegg, 2012), since it shapes 
decision-makers mindsets and structures their practices (Williams et al., 
2012; Edkins et al., 2013). Despite the benefits of a robust front-end 
process for generating appropriate outcomes (in mature organisa-
tions), it can be counterproductive and lead to path dependency (Samset 
et al., 2017). 
3.2.6. The early phase of infrastructure megaprojects 
This category includes issues associated with the nature of the early 
stage of shaping infrastructure megaprojects. Fundamental issues here 
are high uncertainty and complexity (Giezen et al., 2015; Aaltonen et al., 
2016; Edkins et al., 2013). The front-end has the highest potential for 
reducing uncertainty and complexity by shrinking the number of alter-
natives (Samset and Volden, 2016; Samset et al., 2013, 2017), but often 
the focus is on deriving detailed information (Samset and Volden, 2016). 
Detailed information under uncertainty has little value for 
decision-making (Johansen and Wilson, 2006). 
Uncertainty and complexity also cause difficulty shaping value at the 
front-end (Martinsuo et al., 2018) due to scarce relevant information. In 
this regard, a front-end team should only consider high-quality infor-
mation (Samset and Volden, 2016). A common notion for reducing 
uncertainty at the front-end is defining clear goals and objectives for 
projects (Samset and Volden, 2016; Edkins et al., 2013). However, 
Giezen et al. (2015) mention that, to some extent, ambiguity in goals and 
objectives opens space for applying different views to decisions ac-
cording to future changes. 
Stakeholder dynamics at an infrastructure megaproject early phase 
cause changes in stakeholder expectations (Cuppen et al., 2016) and 
sometimes creates conflicts amongst interest groups (Aaltonen et al., 
2016). Different stakeholders have various and sometimes conflicting 
perceptions about the value (Smyth et al., 2018); changing the stake-
holder changes the perceived value and restricts the front-end staff in 
defining project goals and objectives (Martinsuo et al., 2018). 
3.3. What are the remedies for managing the issues at the front-end of 
infrastructure megaprojects? 
With a broad view towards front-end issues, we derive six remedies 
for managing the front-end issues, namely: (1) using more qualitative 
data and less detailed quantitative analysis for decision-making, (2) 
Involving external stakeholders’ views in decision-making, (3) Gener-
ating reliable estimations and controlling the quality of the results, (4) 
Applying lessons learned, (5) Increasing the skills and competencies of 
front-end actors, and (6) Promoting transparency, accountability and 
defining clear roles and responsibilities in project governance. 
3.3.1. Using more qualitative data and less detailed quantitative analysis 
for decision making 
Using more qualitative data and less detailed quantitative analysis 
for decision-making at the front-end of infrastructure megaprojects en-
hances the accuracy of evaluating alternative concepts (Samset and 
Volden, 2016; Samset et al., 2013) and assessing social values (Williams 
and Samset, 2010; Samset and Volden, 2016; Mottee et al., 2020; Vol-
den, 2018). As the result it facilitates front-end value creation (Mottee 
et al., 2020; Smyth et al., 2018; Volden, 2019b) and enhances the 
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front-end outcomes’ half-life (Samset and Volden, 2016; Samset and 
Christensen, 2017; Volden, 2018). 
Conventionally, front-end decisions are based on detailed quantita-
tive information (Samset and Volden, 2016), for which deriving them 
requires time and cost. Decreasing the level of detail in quantitative 
analysis and using more qualitative data for decision-making at the 
front-end of infrastructure megaprojects allows for flexible (Williams 
and Samset, 2010; Volden, 2018) and fast (Samset and Volden, 2016; 
Volden, 2018) decision-making. Samset et al. (2013) mention that the 
front-end team’s first objective should be shrinking project alternatives 
to more feasible concepts by eliminating unfeasible concepts based on 
simple analysis. For instance, a broad understanding of future un-
certainties can lead to eliminating unfeasible concepts (Cascetta et al., 
2015). The rapid assessment also prevents analysis paralysis (Williams 
and Samset, 2010) by increasing the front-end team’s capability in 
dealing with an overwhelming amount of information. 
Decision-making at the front-end of infrastructure megaprojects is 
often based on detailed quantitative information because it is easy to 
justify and compare (Welde and Odeck, 2017). Measuring infrastructure 
megaprojects’ value with quantitative information causes incomplete 
value realisation (Volden, 2019b), whereas using qualitative data for 
assessing values (Volden, 2019b) and social values (Mottee et al., 2020) 
at the front-end enhances the potential for value creation (Volden, 
2019b). 
Using more qualitative data and less detailed quantitative analysis 
for front-end decision-making increases the half-life of the front-end 
outcomes (Mottee et al., 2020; Samset and Christensen, 2017). More-
over, qualitative data is valid for longer and is more reliable for fore-
casting future demand (Welde and Odeck, 2017). For instance, while 
estimating the precise amount of increase or decrease in the future need 
for a service might not be possible, establishing an upward or downward 
trend will be feasible and reliable (Samset and Volden, 2016). 
Using more qualitative data and less detailed quantitative analysis 
for decision-making at the front-end of infrastructure megaprojects does 
not mean there is no need for detailed quantitative information. The 
obstacles in using more qualitative data and less detailed quantitative 
analysis are finding the appropriate level of analysis, aligning quanti-
tative and qualitative data and finding a reasonable balance between the 
qualitative and quantitative data (Williams et al., 2012; Samset and 
Volden, 2016). The latter is highly relevant to engaging external 
stakeholders’ views in decision-making, which is explained in the next 
section. For deriving adequate qualitative data, the front-end team 
should find appropriate and reliable data sources (Nik-Bakht and 
El-Diraby, 2020), and decision-makers should be able to use and 
comprehend them (Klakegg, 2009). 
3.3.2. Involving external stakeholders’ views in decision-making 
Involving external stakeholders refers to using infrastructure mega-
projects’ external stakeholders’ views and meeting their concerns in 
front-end decisions (Aaltonen et al., 2016). External stakeholders range 
from “local citizens, community groups, and environmentalists to those 
stakeholder groups who typically oppose the project and that need to be 
convinced of the project’s worth” (Aaltonen et al., 2016, p17). 
Involving external stakeholders’ views in the front-end decisions 
allows for understanding their core expectations (Morris, 2016; Samset 
et al., 2017) and aligning the infrastructure megaprojects concept with 
their objectives to create social values. Appropriate external stake-
holders involvement develops the sense of ownership and commitment 
amongst them (Aaltonen et al., 2016), and prevents future conflicts and 
leads to smooth project delivery (DiMaddaloni and Davis, 2018; Doloi, 
2018). In this regard, the stakeholder management strategy at the 
front-end of infrastructure megaprojects should be open and flexible 
enough to engage external stakeholders’ views in front-end decisions 
(Aaltonen et al., 2016; Doloi, 2018; Enserink, 2000; Hwang and Yang, 
2014). To this end, project managers’ experience and capability in 
identifying the stakeholders and creating a positive relationship with 
them are essential (Yang, 2014). 
Conventional methods for deriving external stakeholders’ views 
include; “surveys, community meetings, and having active involvement from 
key stakeholders” (George et al., 2008, p73). Also, studies show the 
positive impact of online platforms in engaging external stakeholders’ 
views in infrastructure megaprojects decisions and collaboration (Nik--
Bakht and El-Diraby, 2020; Lorenz, 2011). However, a drawback of 
using these platforms is the complexity of analysing considerable data 
generated from the engagement (Nik-Bakht and El-Diraby, 2020; Lor-
enz, 2011). 
There are obstacles in involving external stakeholders’ views at the 
front-end of infrastructure megaprojects. For instance, Aaltonen et al. 
(2016) mention that external stakeholders might not be able to express 
their views to the required standard, and there is a need to interpret 
them when necessary. Additionally, DiMaddaloni and Davis (2018) state 
that external stakeholder engagement is usually a formal process and 
cannot appropriately contribute to the front-end decisions. To this end, 
organisational culture and the project context should be flexible enough 
to accept diversity in decision-making (Aaltonen et al., 2016). 
3.3.3. Generating reliable estimations and controlling the quality of the 
results 
Reliable estimations are those with minimum variation from the 
actual performance (Welde and Odeck, 2017). The front-end of infra-
structure megaprojects includes several estimations such as cost, time, 
lifecycle, and benefits (Williams et al., 2019); these are the key 
decision-making elements (Edkins et al., 2013). Reliable estimations 
prepare a realistic ground for decision-making, and quality control de-
tects errors and compensates for procedures shortcomings (to an 
acceptable extent) (Williams and Samset, 2010; Flyvbjerg, 2013). This 
decreases the chance of manipulating and prevents high cost-overruns 
during and after the front-end process (Andersen et al., 2016). 
Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) results are essential for defining the 
infrastructure megaproject concept at the front-end (Volden, 2019b). 
Still, CBA is criticised for its vulnerability to biases, especially optimism 
bias (Volden, 2019b), weakness in defining non-monetised benefits 
(Williams and Samset, 2010), and the possibility of manipulating the 
results by beneficiary parties (Volden, 2019b). Moreover, CBA or other 
cost-based analyses do not reflect all aspects of an infrastructure 
megaproject’s impact. Therefore, Samset and Volden (2016) mention 
that CBA should be used with a complementary non-monetised analysis 
such as cost-effectiveness analysis, social impact analysis, multi-criteria 
analysis, and multiple multi-criteria analysis (Kariyawasam et al., 2019) 
to improve estimation accuracy. 
The outside view has an essential role in generating robust estima-
tions, minimising the planning fallacy and decreasing the chance of a 
cost overrun (Flyvbjerg, 2007, 2013). Early estimations are often un-
reliable due to enormous changes to the infrastructure megaproject 
concept during the front-end (Welde and Odeck, 2017). Therefore 
applying cost control by an external party (Flyvbjerg, 2007, 2013) is 
essential for generating realistic estimations and addressing cost devi-
ation associated with the concept changes before committing the project 
(e.g., benchmarking) (Welde and Odeck, 2017; Cantarelli et al., 2010; 
Andersen et al., 2016). 
A key obstacle in generating reliable estimations is perverse in-
centives (Flyvbjerg, 2013); to manage perverse incentives, an assess-
ment framework for the estimating process, including incentives, 
rewards, and penalties, is helpful (Meier, 2008; Flyvbjerg, 2013). The 
other obstacle here is showing the monetary value of qualitative esti-
mations. Since the non-monetary analysis is easy to manipulate and 
interpret regarding a particular party’s interests (Volden, 2019b), the 
quality control’s role in generating reliable estimations is prominent. 
Regular reviews are the typical quality control measures, and in 
applying them, it is crucial to consider the extent that procedures are 
followed (George et al., 2008), and reviewers find the errors (Williams 
et al., 2012). Volden (2018) highlights the impact of the maturity of an 
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organisation in conducting robust reviews. In this regard, the organ-
isational culture and the leadership style are crucial elements for moti-
vating the front-end team to find and communicate errors (Williams 
et al., 2012). 
3.3.4. Applying lessons learned 
Applying lessons learned refers to deriving and systemising the 
knowledge achieved during the planning and delivering an infrastruc-
ture megaproject (Gemünden et al., 2018). Applying lessons learned 
seems neglected from the front-end research agendas (Williams et al., 
2019). Learning and development are bonded together (Morris, 2013a). 
Implementing the front-end without applying lessons learned does not 
improve an infrastructure megaproject’s performance (Fuentes et al., 
2019) since the organisations repeatedly make the same mistakes. 
In front-end literature, lessons learned are discussed for training 
purposes (Williams et al., 2012; Miller and Hobbs, 2005; Burger et al., 
2019; Winch and Leiringer, 2016), creating a database for deriving and 
validating estimations (which also facilitates conducting reliable esti-
mations) (Flyvbjerg, 2013; Volden, 2018) and evaluating alternative 
concepts (Samset and Christensen, 2017). The results of scientific 
studies (Morris, 2016) and ex-post analysis (Volden, 2018) are common 
sources for capturing and systemising lessons learned. The lessons are 
formally conveyed through organisations by robust training procedures 
(Williams et al., 2012; Miller and Hobbs, 2005) and informally by senior 
managers such as the project sponsor through coaching (Morris, 2013a; 
Kloppenborg and Tesch, 2009) and mentoring (Williams et al., 2012; 
Edkins et al., 2013; Kloppenborg and Tesch, 2009). Organisational 
culture significantly impacts capturing and systemising lessons learned 
(Williams et al., 2012, 2019) in both formal and informal approaches. 
In the formal approach, organisational culture impacts the proced-
ures for training the employees (Williams et al., 2012) and deriving 
“ex-post analysis” (Miller and Hobbs, 2005; Volden, 2018). In this re-
gard, mature organisations have robust procedures for capturing and 
applying lessons learned (Williams et al., 2019; Miller and Hobbs, 2005; 
Volden, 2018). 
In the informal approach, organisational culture impacts applying 
lessons learned by impacting project management structure (Williams 
et al., 2012; Edkins et al., 2013) and leadership style (Morris, 2013a). To 
this end, the sponsor should perform a mentor’s role to share tacit 
knowledge (Kloppenborg and Tesch, 2009); they should also increase 
learning effectiveness through group activities (Morris, 2013a; Edkins 
et al., 2013). 
To create an appropriate database, adequate experience in managing 
a spectrum of infrastructure megaprojects is essential for organisations, 
but many organisations do not have that background (Miller and Hobbs, 
2005). Organisations also tend to focus on future projects instead of 
learning from past projects (Samset and Volden, 2016). Volden (2018) 
mentions organisations are under time pressure to start the next project 
thus they do not capture lessons learned. Also, organisations are reluc-
tant to disclose their mistakes in public (Williams et al., 2012), and 
project managers do not see any benefit in learning from past experience 
and applying to future projects because they believe each project is a 
unique endeavour (Williams and Samset, 2010). In this regard, Miller 
and Hobbs (2005) emphasise the government’s role in capturing lessons 
from governmental projects. 
3.3.5. Increasing the skills and competencies of the front-end actors 
The skills and competencies of front-end actors are significant factors 
in generating front-end outcomes (Morris, 2013a, 2016; Morris and 
Geraldi, 2011). Front-end has three levels, namely institutional, stra-
tegic and project (Morris and Geraldi, 2011). By front-end actors, we 
mean the groups of people who implement front-end and make the de-
cisions. There are four key actors in the front-end, namely: 
(1) Politicians/Policymakers: responsible for front-end decision-mak-
ing in the government (Klakegg, 2009; Samset et al., 2013).  
(2) Owner: individual or organisation that is the most influential 
actor at the institutional level for defining project goals and long- 
term strategies (Edkins et al., 2013; Morris, 2016). 
(3) Sponsor: responsible for conveying the strategy from the institu-
tional level to the project level, assuring the strategic alignment 
between different levels (Morris and Geraldi, 2011), and facili-
tating the delivery of the strategies by structuring the project 
management practice (Edkins et al., 2013). 
(4) Project manager: responsible for implementing projects and stra-
tegies (Williams and Samset, 2010) under the sponsor’s 
supervision. 
The significance of front-end actors’ skills and competencies, espe-
cially strategic competencies, are frequently cited in the literature 
(Williams and Samset, 2010; Morris, 2013a; Edkins et al., 2013). In 
front-end literature, skills and competencies are discussed in managerial 
skills and competencies (Klakegg, 2009; Morris, 2013a, 2016; Edkins 
et al., 2013) and individual competencies (Williams and Samset, 2010; 
Edkins et al., 2013). 
Managerial skills and competencies. Due to the nature of the work at the 
front-end of infrastructure megaprojects (Edkins et al., 2013), strategic 
competencies are essential for the front-end team (Morris and Geraldi, 
2011). Morris (2016) highlights the professional institutions’ role in 
promoting the required skills and competencies regarding the strategic 
aspects of managing the front-end process. 
The owner and sponsor should have enough competencies to struc-
ture and define governance, strategy and commercial aspects at the 
front-end of infrastructure megaprojects (Kloppenborg and Tesch, 2009; 
Winch and Leiringer, 2016). Kloppenborg and Tesch (2009, p154) 
mention three competencies for sponsors to manage the front-end: 
“defining performance/success, mentoring the project manager, and priori-
tising projects.” The latter refers to the sponsor’s role to choose and 
prioritise projects that align with the organisation’s strategic objectives. 
Adequate leadership has an essential role in improving front-end 
outcomes by involving individual senior managers or a “constituted 
board” (Edkins et al., 2013, p76). Leadership is a necessary skill for 
project managers at all levels of the organisation (i.e., institutional, 
strategic and projects), and it has different implications and functions at 
each level. For instance, at the institutional level, leadership capabilities 
enable managing the front-end of infrastructure megaprojects in terms 
of “establishing strategy, forming teams, making decisions and so on" (Morris 
and Geraldi, 2011, p27). 
Edkins et al. (2013) propose a list of six competencies for managing 
front-end with a strong emphasis on leadership: "(1) Leadership and 
decision-making, (2) Selecting individuals and forming teams, (3) Technical 
and technology assessment, (4) Project scoping, (5) Risk and value assess-
ment, and (6) Establishing and instilling an appropriate oversight and 
governance system” (p77). 
Individual competencies. Individual competencies apply to all project 
actors. Gut feeling (Klakegg et al., 2016) and intuitive decision-making 
capabilities (Williams and Samset, 2010) are two essential comple-
mentary judgmental competencies for formal front-end decision-mak-
ing. These are examples of decision-making capabilities based on simple 
analysis and qualitative approaches that using them requires manage-
ment integrity (Morris and Geraldi, 2011), creative thinking and 
seniority in the front-end team (Williams et al., 2012). 
The front-end team’s seniority and experience are essential elements 
for decision-making at the front-end of infrastructure megaprojects. 
However, over-reliance on past experience limits creativity in making 
front-end decisions (Williams et al., 2012; Edkins et al., 2013); this calls 
for diversity in the front-end team. 
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3.3.6. Promoting transparency and accountability and defining clear roles 
and responsibilities in project governance 
Transparency and accountability are essential elements of project 
governance (Samset and Volden, 2017). Promoting transparency and 
accountability and defining clear roles and responsibilities of each 
project party in project governance allows for managing projects for 
their context and increases the potential to manage front-end issues 
(Samset and Volden, 2017). Klakegg (2009) emphasises project gover-
nance’s role in defining clear roles and responsibilities at the front-end 
of infrastructure megaprojects to manage front-end issues. 
Klakegg (2009) and Samset and Volden (2016) state that trans-
parency is crucial for implementing any remedies for managing 
front-end issues. An organisation can increase transparency by estab-
lishing a transparent “decision-making process, [and saving] the documents 
used as a basis for decisions, in reviews and monitoring” (Klakegg, 2009, 
p513). Transparent decision-making facilitates external stakeholders’ 
participation in decision-making (Samset and Volden, 2017), increases 
the CBA effectiveness (Volden, 2019b) and reduces corruption in the 
project context (Locatelli et al., 2017). It is noteworthy to remind that 
transparency is not disclosing analytical data to the public (Lorenz, 
2011) but is an element of organisational culture, procedures, and 
project context (Locatelli et al., 2017). Transparency is also a precon-
dition for accountability (Samset and Volden, 2017) since, with a lack of 
transparency, the roles and responsibilities and procedures followed for 
making front-end decisions are unclear. 
Accountability and transparency are correlated, which means that 
enhancing transparency in decision-making (Shiferaw and Klakegg, 
2012; Shiferaw et al., 2012) and generating front-end outcomes 
(Flyvbjerg, 2007) increases accountability. For instance, increasing 
transparency in documenting the decision-making process and giving 
voice to the external stakeholders increases accountability (Samset and 
Volden, 2017). Also, exercising transparent cost estimations (Andersen 
et al., 2016) controlling measures at the front-end (Winch and Leiringer, 
2016) and ex-post evaluations (Volden, 2018) play a significant role in 
increasing accountability at the front-end of infrastructure megaproj-
ects. All in all, increasing accountability reduces the potential for mis-
representing the estimations’ results, which is a precondition for 
improving estimations’ accuracy (Flyvbjerg, 2007). 
4. What are the connections between front-end issues and 
remedies for managing them? 
Appendix 1 (Table 5) comprehensively shows the connection be-
tween issues and remedies for managing them. To create Appendix 1, we 
divided each remedy into the links that connect it to the issues (Table 3 
represents the issues). Of course, there are elements of arbitrary judg-
ment in identifying these links and using the binary reductionist 
approach (i.e., yes/no) to link the issues and remedies. However, we see 
the table as a broad image for identifying the issues and finding the 
relevant remedies for managing them. For policymakers and project 
managers, this could be a blueprint for managing the front-end issues. 
For academics investigating front-end (and projects in general), it could 
be a useful starting point. 
The links explained in Section 3.3 refer to how a remedy manages the 
issue(s), and the dots in Appendix 1 represent these connections be-
tween issues and their respective remedies. We created Appendix 1 
through group discussions and brainstorming sessions. 
Table 4 is a brief version of Appendix 1, in which each value repre-
sents the number of connections between front-end issues and remedies. 
The table’s last row represents the total number of connections that each 
remedy has to the themes, and the last column represents the total 
number of connections that each theme has to the remedies. 
Regarding issues, the table shows that front-end issues are interre-
lated and exist in different levels of an organisation. There is no single 
remedy that can manage all the issues, but a series of them must be in 
place. Among the six themes, Politicians and Decision-Makers have 
more connections to the remedies, which indicates this theme includes 
essential issues and attracts researchers’ attention. The theme Project 
Context has the lowest number of connections to the remedies, leaving 
the front-end team with limited possibilities to manage the issues, even 
though the importance of managing a project for its context is 
emphasised in the literature (Merrow, 2011; Morris and Geraldi, 2011). 
According to those mentioned above, it is noteworthy to emphasise 
that some issues have more connections to the remedies because more 
research is available for managing them; it does not indicate that they 
are more important or complicated than the issues with fewer connec-
tions. For instance, optimism bias receives more attention than cor-
ruption, though corruption can play an equally (if not more) important 
role in deviating front-end outcomes. 
In terms of remedies, Appendix 1 shows that the remedies are inter-
related and should be employed simultaneously to have more effec-
tiveness. Project governance is the key remedy for managing 
infrastructure megaproject front-end issues since it offers more con-
nections to the issues and covers more issues than other remedies. This 
emphasises the significance of project governance in empowering other 
remedies (Burger et al., 2019) and facilitating managing a project for its 
context (Edkins et al., 2013). The most important takeaway is that the 
project governance that promotes transparency and accountability and 
defines clear roles and responsibilities in the project is the most effective 
remedy to reduce the front-end issues and improve front-end outcomes. 
Applying lessons learned is the remedy that offers the least connec-
tions to the issues. However, it is not a good indicator of the importance 
of applying lessons learned, considering that applying lessons learned is 
a precondition for creating a sound database for generating reliable 
estimations and controlling the quality of the results. 
Therefore, applying lessons learned requires more attention from 
researchers, a finding that is consistent with Williams et al. (2019). As is 
noted, remedies not only manage the issues but also empower one 
another, and, often, more than one remedy is required for managing one 
issue. 
5. Toward a better front-end of infrastructure megaprojects 
The findings show that front-end issues are interrelated and exist in 
different levels of an organisation which managing them requires using 
remedies simultaneously. Therefore policymakers, project managers 
and society should work together to be able to apply the remedies and 
increase the infrastructure megaprojects’ social and financial values. In 
this respect, the organisational culture of key internal stakeholders and 
the front-end procedure they follow are catalysts for using remedies 
effectively (Williams et al., 2012; Edkins et al., 2013) and preparing the 
ground for cooperation among policymakers, project managers and so-
ciety. This section summarises the key implications of our research for 
policymakers, project managers, and society. 
5.1. Implications for policymakers 
Policymakers are critical stakeholders in megaprojects. They often 
promote megaprojects and shape them based on their visions or 
agendas, if not interests (Samset and Volden, 2016). The literature dis-
cusses how different megaproject temporalities and political mandates 
could foster opportunistic behaviours (Flyvbjerg, 2014; Locatelli et al., 
2017). Still, our research shows how policymakers can be fundamental 
actors in the infrastructure front-end to foster the value delivered by a 
megaproject to society. Our research implications for policymakers 
include the following. 
Applying lessons learned, and generating reliable estimations and 
controlling the quality of the results, requires a database consisting of 
the data collected from a spectrum of projects beyond a single com-
pany’s database (Miller and Hobbs, 2005). Therefore, policymakers 
should support the creation and development of such a database using 
organisations such as Nationally Significant Infrastructure Projects 
A. Babaei et al.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
Project Leadership and Society 2 (2021) 100032
11
(NSIPS), National Audit Office (NAO) and Infrastructure Projects Au-
thority (IPA). These organisations are significant agents in collecting 
lessons learned and creating a database consisting of a spectrum of 
projects for all parties involved in the front-end of infrastructure 
megaprojects (Miller and Hobbs, 2005; Flyvbjerg, 2013; Volden, 2018). 
Policymakers need to develop frameworks and procedures that foster 
transparency at front-end processes (Samset and Volden, 2017; Klakegg 
et al., 2016). The IPA in the UK or similar organisations in other coun-
tries are essential to promote transparency and accountability to the 
decision-making process, prioritising alternatives or zero option studies, 
assuring effective involvement of external stakeholders in the 
decision-making process, and so on. 
5.2. Implications for project managers 
Appendix 1 demonstrates the primary contribution of our study for 
project managers, which can be used as a checklist or a compact “guide 
for actions”. Appendix 1 summarises the main front-end issues, rem-
edies and connections between them. The links between issues and 
remedies explained in previous sections represent a “gateway” for 
project managers to learn more about managing front-end issues. 
Table 3 suggests several front-end issues such as reluctance to say no 
to the higher managers (Flyvbjerg, 2007), too much confidence in 
front-end outcomes (Samset and Volden, 2017) and no effort to find 
alternative concepts (Klakegg, 2009; Meier, 2008; Welde and Odeck, 
2017), are rooted in the project managers’ working behaviour. There-
fore, an appropriate framework with adequate incentives and penalties 
should be in place to assess project managers performance (Flyvbjerg, 
2007, 2013). 
Project managers also need to consider using more qualitative 
decision-making approaches and avoid generating detailed analysis, 
especially at front-end early stages (Samset et al., 2013). For instance, 
design thinking offers a new and innovative approach to managing 
front-end complexities (Ben Mahmoud-Jouini et al., 2016). 
Findings show that external stakeholders’ views are not well 
considered at the front-end of infrastructure megaprojects (Aaltonen 
et al., 2016). Project managers need to employ open and flexible 
stakeholder management approaches that give voice to diverse views in 
project decisions (Aaltonen et al., 2016; Doloi, 2018; Enserink, 2000; 
Hwang and Yang, 2014). This prepares the ground for using qualitative 
methods to create value for projects (Volden, 2018) and manage projects 
for their contexts (Morris and Geraldi, 2011). 
The literature shows the gap in project management skills associated 
with what is needed for managing the front-end of infrastructure 
megaprojects, as opposed to a traditional project (Morris, 2013a, 2016; 
Edkins et al., 2013; Morris and Geraldi, 2011). To fill this gap, the in-
stitutions that prepare professional knowledge and those that educate 
project managers must equip project managers with the required skills 
and competencies for managing front-end of infrastructure megaproj-
ects (Williams et al., 2019; Tranfield et al., 2003). 
5.3. Implications for society 
Infrastructure megaprojects must meet social needs and expectations 
(Samset et al., 2013). People within the affected society – i.e., local 
communities (DiMaddaloni and Davis, 2017), end-users (Fuentes et al., 
2019) etc.– should be at the centre of decision-making. The front-end is 
the best opportunity to engage the abovementioned groups as external 
stakeholders and give voice to their views in decision-making (Aaltonen 
et al., 2016). This requires the society to engage with the front-end 
proactively and leads to developing an infrastructure megaproject 
concept aligned with society’s expectations and the United Nation’s 
Sustainable Development Goals. The remedies presented in this paper 
should be demanded by societies and their representatives when dis-
cussing the front-end of new infrastructure. Also, the issue presented in 
Table 3 can be operationalised as a checklist for identifying red flags. 
With this paper being open access, we believe that stakeholders such as 
NGOs and journalists could be more knowledgeable when discussing (or 
scrutinising) the front-end of infrastructure. 
Table 4 
Summary of Appendix 1; the number of the connection between front-end issues and remedies.   
Remedies Using more 
qualitative data 


























defining clear roles 
and responsibilities in 
project governance  






0 0 0 1 4 1 11 
Staff working 
behaviour 




Political bias 0 1 1 0 0 6 22 
Lack of evidence- 
based decision- 
making 






2 0 0 1 0 1 11 
Generating the 
Outcomes 
1 1 2 1 2 0 
Human factors Cognitive biases 1 0 2 1 0 2 13 
Restrictions 4 0 0 1 2 0 
Project context Changes in the 
project context 
1 0 0 0 0 2 7 
Characteristics 
of the projects’ 
context 
0 0 1 0 0 3 






4 5 0 2 2 3 16 
Remedies total connections 14 7 17 7 11 24   
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5.4. Limitations to the study 
There are two sets of limitations worth discussing: research limita-
tions and literature limitations. From these limitations, we will elaborate 
on future research for the front-end of infrastructure megaprojects. 
In our research, we focused on the scientific literature, i.e., peer- 
reviewed papers. Indeed, several stakeholders such as the World Bank, 
the OECD and even consultancy companies have investigated the front- 
end. It would therefore be useful to assess the differences between these 
bodies of literature. In this research, we considered the front-end as a 
single process. In practice, the front-end consists of a series of different 
yet interrelated sub-processes, such as cost estimation or risk analysis 
etc. Future research should focus on these sub-processes and their 
operational capabilities. Regarding the limitations of the literature, it is 
clear how infrastructure megaprojects in the global south are far less 
investigated than those in developed countries. Indeed, authors from the 
global south are far less represented; therefore, little is known about the 
front-end of infrastructure megaprojects in those countries and the im-
plications for those societies. 
5.5. Future research 
The paper paves the way to further studies about the front-end of 
infrastructure megaprojects. In particular, there are several possible 
research avenues for future studies to improve front-end outcomes. 
Findings of the SLR show that, although managing a project for its 
context is recommended as one of the critical elements of improving 
front-end outcomes (Samset et al., 2013), not much attention have been 
given to manage the issues associated with this theme. 
There is a consensus among project management scholars about the 
different nature of front-end tasks compared to conventional project 
management (Morris, 2013a, 2016; Edkins et al., 2013). However, 
except for Edkins et al. (2013) and some dispersed literature about the 
required competencies for front-end project managers, no research in-
vestigates the necessary skills and competencies explicitly for front-end. 
Another aspect of front-end research is the difference between front- 
end processes in different infrastructure projects. One example of this 
comparison is Elzomor et al. (2018), which compared front-end re-
quirements between small and large infrastructure. There is a need for 
more research to show the differences between the front-end of different 
infrastructure megaproject categories. For instance, the difference be-
tween the front-end of a nuclear power plant and a railroad or the 
front-end for building a new power plant and decommissioning an old 
power plant can be some topics for more investigations. 
There is also a lack of research considering the zero option. Future 
research on this topic can answer questions such as ‘To what extent a 
front-end team considers the zero option as a significant alternative to a 
project concept?’, ‘What characteristics of an old infrastructure make it 
viable as a zero option?’ and ‘What are the barriers against defining zero 
option as the project concept?’ Based on BenMahmoud-Jouin et al. 
(BenMahmoud-Jouini et al., 2016), design thinking can be used at the 
front-end. For instance, design thinking application at the front-end of 
infrastructures in defining a feasible concept regarding zero option, 
value creation, qualitative approaches etc. 
6. Conclusions 
The front-end is a key driver for the success of infrastructure. Still, it 
remains poorly executed, with several issues undermining the value of 
infrastructure megaprojects to society and the environment. This paper 
aims to systemise knowledge and understanding of the front-end of 
infrastructure megaprojects, the main front-end issues, and the remedies 
for managing them. 
To answer the research question ‘What definition can appropriately 
describe front-end of infrastructure megaprojects?’, we derived five 
critical characteristics of front-end of infrastructure megaprojects from 
12 definitions; these characteristics include: (1) Exploratory nature, (2) 
Generating managerial information, (3) Shaping a feasible concept, (4) 
Front-end terminates with a decision, and (5) Uncertainty. Thus, we 
defined the front-end of infrastructure megaprojects as: 
‘An exploratory process for generating necessary information to 
shape a feasible concept for an infrastructure megaproject, assess the 
concepts’ uncertainties and make the final go/no-go decision.’ 
In answering the question ‘What are the issues at front-end of 
infrastructure megaprojects?’, we gathered 44 issues and clustered them 
into six themes according to their context: (1) Front-end process, (2) 
Front-end project managers, (3) Politicians and Decision-makers, (4) 
Project context, (5) Human factors, and (6) The early phase of infra-
structure megaprojects. Then we explained the interrelations between 
the issues and exhibited them in Table 2. The findings show that front- 
end issues are interrelated and exist in different levels off an 
organisation. 
To answer ‘What are the remedies for managing the issues at front- 
end of infrastructure megaprojects?’, we derived six remedies for man-
aging the front-end issues, namely: (1) Using more qualitative data and 
less detailed quantitative analysis for decision-making, (2) Involving 
external stakeholders’ views in decision-making, (3) Generating reliable 
estimations and controlling the quality of the results, (4) Applying les-
sons learned, (5) Increasing the skills and competencies of the front-end 
actors, and (6) Promoting transparency and accountability and defining 
clear roles and responsibilities in project governance. We explained the 
remedies by explaining each remedy’s meaning, the area of its impact, 
how the remedies manage the issue (the link to the issue), and the ob-
stacles against implementing each remedy. 
Lastly, to sufficiently answer ‘What is the connection between front- 
end issues and remedies?’, we created a table that uses the results of 
research questions two (front-end issues – columns) and three (front-end 
remedies – rows) to show the connection between front-end issues and 
remedies (see Table 5). The findings show that remedies for managing 
the front-end issues should be used simultaneously to effectively manage 
the issues, and organisational culture and the front-end procedures play 
a significant role in preparing the ground for applying the remedies. 
Project governance that promotes transparency and accountability and 
defines clear roles and responsibilities is the most important remedy for 
managing the front-end issues and facilitating the application of other 
remedies. 
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